The U.S. has better global intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities than Russia.
By
David C. Gompert
Americans shudder at the mention of nuclear war, especially by Vladimir Putin. This reaction is understandable—civilization is at stake—but it can obscure thinking about whether and how nuclear war between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization might begin and proceed. Absent an informed assessment of this grave matter, U.S. policy makers likely would be gripped by visceral fear and avoid any action that could heighten the risk of nuclear war. Mr. Putin is showing he can manipulate these fears and thus avoid strong Western responses to his war crimes. Russian doctrine on nuclear war is clear: Moscow has said it would consider initiating nuclear hostilities if Russian soil is attacked by nonnuclear weapons or the existence of the Russian state is in danger. Mr. Putin’s public statements since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine confirm this. He hasn’t said Russia would resort to nuclear weapons if NATO were to intervene in defense of Ukraine. Rather, he has restated that the threshold for Russian use of nuclear weapons would be “threats to our country.” Mr. Putin says NATO intervention in Ukraine could escalate to nuclear war, but not that Russia would use nuclear weapons in reaction to such intervention. A NATO attack on Russian territory in the course of intervention in Ukraine could trigger Russian use of nuclear weapons. But NATO has sufficient military superiority that it doesn’t need to attack Russian territory to help Ukraine defeat Russia. This isn’t to recommend such intervention; rather, it is to question the logic that such intervention would set off a nuclear conflict.
Yet voices of authority have reinforced the perception that direct NATO-Russia hostilities would result in Russian use of nuclear weapons. The U.N. secretary-general has said as much. In recent congressional testimony, U.S. intelligence bosses said the danger of nuclear war would increase if NATO forces entered Ukraine yet failed to explain that Russian doctrine regarding attacks on Russia itself as the threshold to initiate nuclear war. This doesn’t mean that Mr. Putin can’t use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. He has a numerical advantage over NATO in tactical nuclear weapons. Yet there are three powerful inhibitions against doing so. First, as we see daily, Russian forces are capable of leveling Ukrainian cities with nonnuclear weapons, though it would take longer. Second, Russia would become a permanent global outcast if it used nuclear weapons against Ukrainian cities. Third and most important, if Russia used nuclear weapons against NATO forces in Ukraine or against NATO members, it could face nuclear retaliation by the U.S. as well as the U.K. and France.
The point isn’t that the U.S. can ignore the danger of nuclear war, but rather that Russia has at least as much to fear as NATO does—a reality that is clouded by Mr. Putin’s brazen threats and Washington’s palpable fear. Russian military strategists believe the U.S. has exceptional, multilayered capabilities for such a contingency. U.S. global intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities are far better than Russia’s. These could be used to direct nonnuclear strikes with global reach and pinpoint accuracy against Russia’s retaliatory (“second strike”) nuclear forces. The U.S. also has more survivable, accurate and reliable offensive nuclear forces that could further decimate Russia’s strategic deterrent on the ground. Whatever Russian missiles survive such disarming strikes would be picked off by U.S. missile defense systems, or so the Russians believe.
Western hysteria about Mr. Putin’s willingness to use nuclear weapons has been compounded by the suspicion that he has a screw loose. Yet there has been no authoritative diagnosis that Mr. Putin’s psychiatric state would cause him to use nuclear weapons despite the danger of Russia’s annihilation in retaliation. When U.S. intelligence chiefs testify that Mr. Putin is mad, they mean angry, not insane. There is also an impression in the West that Mr. Putin has complete control over the release of nuclear weapons. He doesn’t. While his approval to launch is required, he has no way to act over the opposition of his top generals. This isn’t to say that U.S. policy makers and intelligence chiefs should ignore the possibility that any direct hostilities between the U.S. and Russia could increase the risk of nuclear war. Rather, it is to say that Russia should be at least as fearful as America is. The more the U.S. falls for Mr. Putin’s nuclear messaging, and the more we signal that the U.S. dreads nuclear war more than Russia does, the less restrained Mr. Putin will be in Ukraine, and the more Ukrainian lives will be lost.
Mr. Gompert served as acting director of national intelligence, 2009-10.
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