patrick.net

And 45 minutes later, here is Bob's response:

http://www.youtube.com/embed/Re72di5phM0

So Tat:

indigenous says

We find that adherence to the act led to riskier lending by banks: in the six quarters surrounding the CRA exams lending is elevated on average by about 5 percent every quarter and loans in these quarters default by about 15 percent more often. These patterns are accentuated in CRA-eligible census tracts and are concentrated among large banks. The effects are strongest during the time period when the market for private securitization was booming.

Excellent--so please explain how this 5% increase in lending in ONLY the CRA-eligible census tracts led to the housing bubble.

Focus on how it caused housing prices to rise in non-CRA areas where the bubble was most prevalent.

indigenous says

The otherwise inexplicable collapse in lending standards and the financial crisis that followed is explained by the economic rent sharing collaboration between political groups like ACORN, the government, the GSEs, and the emerging megabanks to promote home ownership among those previously unable to qualify for a mortgage.

lol--how is it explained? Why did a program designed to help low income families in specific red-lined areas cause private institutions not regulated by the CRA to make risky loans in non-redlined areas? Help me out with that question.

indigenous says

So Tat:

My thoughts exactly. Hard to believe there are still people out there that believe the CRA had anything to do with the housing bubble.

Read what I posted it explains very well. In a nutshell it has to do with a culture being setup by the Fed to prove that a bank was a "good citizen" which the banks spent a couple trillion dollars on which fomented these citizen groups to get in on the free money. The CRA was a seminal agency to this end.

The other factor is that if the banks lowered their standards for one group they had to lower it for all groups

And another factor is that the government would pickup any loses from these type loans. So there was no danger to the bankers losing.

Read the material, I'm not your teacher, do the work...

indigenous says

Read what I posted it explains very well. In a nutshell it has to do with a culture being setup by the Fed to prove that a bank was a "good citizen" which the banks spent a couple trillion dollars on which fomented these citizen groups to get in on the free money. The CRA was a seminal agency to this end.

So, how did it apply to the savings and loans that weren't subject to CRA at all??

And how did giving loans to underqualified folks in affluent neighborhoods give the "good citizen" proof?

Obviously you're not the teacher, I'm trying to show you why you and your BS sources are 100% incorrect.

"So, how did it apply to the savings and loans that weren't subject to CRA at all??"

Now I remember why I have you on ignore...

indigenous says

"So, how did it apply to the savings and loans that weren't subject to CRA at all??"

Now I remember why I have you on ignore...

Because you lose every debate?

"Because you lose every debate?"

No because I have a policy not to argue with idiots.

I will not respond any more as I'm going to my happy place.

indigenous says

"Because you lose every debate?"

No because I have a policy not to argue with idiots.

I will not respond any more as I'm going to my happy place.

Enjoy.

indigenous says

Did the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) Lead to Risky Lending?

Online access to NBER Working Papers denied, you have no subscription

Sumit Agarwal, Efraim Benmelech, Nittai Bergman, Amit Seru

NBER Working Paper No. 18609

Issued in December 2012

NBER Program(s): AP CF

indigenous says

Yes, it did. We use exogenous variation in banks' incentives to conform to the standards of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) around regulatory exam dates to trace out the effect of the CRA on lending activity. Our empirical strategy compares lending behavior of banks undergoing CRA exams within a given census tract in a given month to the behavior of banks operating in the same census tract-month that do not face these exams. We find that adherence to the act led to riskier lending by banks: in the six quarters surrounding the CRA exams lending is elevated on average by about 5 percent every quarter and loans in these quarters default by about 15 percent more often. These patterns are accentuated in CRA-eligible census tracts and are concentrated among large banks. The effects are strongest during the time period when the market for private securitization was booming.

This means exactly nothing. It's a paragraph from a paper no on can see. Post a link to the whole paper so we can see what the terms mean and what the research is. Otherwise it's a joke.

indigenous says

And 45 minutes later, here is Bob's response:

Sorry some of us have lives.

bob2356 says

Post a link to the whole paper so we can see what the terms mean and what the research is. Otherwise it's a joke.

Simply copy and paste the text into google. The others are linked. Which substantiates it more than you mutts have ever substantiated anything on the subject.

The only thing I remember is AF posting something anecdotal from one of his coworkers.

Obama can't magically fix everything man. He is a president, not a miracle worker.

indigenous says

bob2356 says

Post a link to the whole paper so we can see what the terms mean and what the research is. Otherwise it's a joke.

Simply copy and paste the text into google.

Doesn't work, all that comes up is the same 1 paragraph. Since it works so well for you post the link.

indigenous says

The others are linked.

Yes, and just like last time they don't do anything but say the moon is made of green cheese. No research of any kind, No footnotes, No sources, No links. No data. No methodology. Nothing, nada. Just I feel it's true so it must be true. I can see why these appeal to you a lot.

Like I said your definition of prove is certainly unique, quite unlike anyone else's in the known universe.

Here is the link to the website for the book fragile by design:

http://press.princeton.edu/titles/10177.html

indigenous says

Here is the link to the website for the book fragile by design:

http://press.princeton.edu/titles/10177.html

That's nice, if you've read it then you should be able to lay out your arguments without cutting and pasting the review off a website.

We were talking about the NBER paper cut and paste. A single paragraph with zero context means nothing. Except to you, where if PROVES beyond a doubt.

bob2356 says

That's nice, if you've read it then you should be able to lay out your arguments without cutting and pasting the review off a website.

Bullshit, I'm not that interested to read a book on the banking industry in the world.

I got the gist of it by listening to the podcast, hell 2 minutes covers the main point, from about 20 to 22.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A6ghZDMQaZo

Besides I have laid it out in my own words in the above posts...

There are no feelings about it, just the facts.

Unlike you, I have solidly backed my argument up...

indigenous says

Unlike you, I have solidly backed my argument up...

I'm not even sure you know how to make an argument, much less back it up.

http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2012/2012-005.pdf

finehoe says

http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2012/2012-005.pdf

Fuck you here is a link with 30 pages of yik yak.

Where they say:

"Although we find evidence that the GSEs bought significant quantities of subprime securities, our
results indicate that these purchases were not directly related to affordable housing mandates"

They are missing the point I'm making in that the standards were raised across the board.

They are also missing the point that the CRA indirectly created more lending to unqualified people across the board, because there was no risk for the bankers, as the government tacitly and by implication of the system, "fragile by design", removed risk by backstopping any such loans.

The reason the banks did this, beside the obvious reason to make more money, was to further grow and centralize banking.